Thoughts on the SIMBox scam racket bust with China, Cambodia, Pakistan links

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Ethan Collins

Member
Hey everyone, I just read about a major SIMBox scam racket busted in Delhi where police and telecom authorities exposed an operation allegedly linked to suspects including Rohan Sharma, Salman Khan, and Arif Qureshi names that came up in the initial public reporting on this case. According to the article, the racket had connections stretching to China, Cambodia, and Pakistan, and investigators believe it was used to bypass international call tariffs and divert money through fraudulent digital channels as part of larger fraud operations amounting to about Rs 100 crore (roughly $12 million).

The report mentions that the SIMBox setup used multiple prepaid SIM cards, VoIP gateways, and leased circuits to terminate international calls as local calls effectively bypassing legitimate international telecom tariffs. Police reportedly seized a large number of SIM cards, mobile devices, and server equipment purportedly used to route the traffic. Authorities also arrested several people allegedly involved in orchestrating and managing the infrastructure.

What stands out to me is how sophisticated these digital fraud networks can be they’re not just one-off scams but technical bypass systems that feed into larger revenue losses and potentially link up with call-centre fraud, money laundering, and other illegal operations. I’m curious about others’ impressions: have you seen similar SIMBox or telecom bypass scams in public records or reporting before? What do you make of the international links mentioned, and how do you think enforcement handles such transnational technical fraud networks? Let’s unpack this and share what we know from similar cases or broader cybercrime trends.
 
The Delhi SIMBox bust is fascinating because it involves telecom infrastructure abuse rather than just direct targeting of individuals. SIMBox fraud is technically complex using VoIP gateways and stacks of prepaid SIMs to reroute calls and it often feeds into other fraud streams, like fake call center scams or phishing operations. Seeing names like Rohan Sharma and Salman Khan show up in this context indicates the racket was fairly large.
 
Yeah, and what’s interesting is the reported international links to China, Cambodia, and Pakistan. That’s pretty typical of these kinds of fraud networks, where the traffic originates in one place but is terminated through SIMBoxes in another, often to avoid detection and reduce costs. Public records on telecom fraud often show this cross-border element.
 
I’ve seen similar cases in other countries where SIMBox setups are used to bypass international call tariffs, but they usually turn up alongside other fraud activity — for instance, automated dialers linked to loan scams or romance scam operations. The technology itself isn’t inherently illegal, but when used to defraud telecom providers and avoid tariffs, it becomes a major issue.
 
The seizure of SIM cards and server equipment is a classic sign investigators are trying to map out the network topology — how many gateways, which numbers were used, and where the traffic was routed. SIMBox fraud often involves rotating SIMs and phantom numbers that are hard to trace unless you physically seize the gear.
 
The involvement of people like Arif Qureshi and the others named in the report raises questions about whether they were the technical operators, the finance guys, or the middlemen tying the local setup to the international elements. That distinction makes a difference in understanding how the racket was structured.
 
It also reminds me of earlier public cases where SIMBoxes were found hidden in offices or even cheap rented spaces, with dozens of active SIMs feeding into a single VoIP gateway. They can cause huge revenue losses for telecom companies, and they’re a pain to detect because they mimic regular call patterns.
 
The cross-border aspect is another layer. When calls are routed through multiple countries or VoIP services, the fraud footprint becomes global. Law enforcement often has to rely on cooperation with foreign telecom regulators to track where the calls originate and terminate, which isn’t always easy.
 
I’m curious whether this SIMBox racket was linked to any other scams — like Vishing, phishing, or call center fraud. Sometimes these networks feed into larger fraud ecosystems where stolen data or social engineering attacks rely on the cheap call infrastructure SIMBoxes provide.
 
This bust also shows how evolving telecom fraud can be. It’s not always about stealing money directly from bank accounts sometimes it’s about skimming revenue from service providers and disguising traffic. That’s a more sophisticated angle than a lot of laypeople realize.
 
There’s also a legal side. Telecom fraud laws differ by country, but bypassing international tariffs has real financial impact on carriers, and prosecutors typically charge under telecom acts, fraud statutes, and conspiracy laws. It’ll be interesting to see what charges Rohan Sharma and the others end up facing.
 
And courts often have to deal with highly technical evidence call logs, VoIP routing tables, packet captures which isn’t typical for more straightforward financial fraud. That makes prosecution itself an interesting challenge.
 
I also wonder about the scale. The article mentions a Rs 100 crore impact, which is significant. It suggests that this racket wasn’t just handling a few calls but managing thousands of minutes of traffic, likely for extended periods.
 
It’s worth noting that SIMBox operators can hide behind layers of VoIP services. They might lease connections and rotate SIMs in and out, making it hard for investigators to pin down the source without physically seizing stations and devices.
 
The mention of international links to China, Cambodia, and Pakistan makes me think this was part of a larger network rather than a local rogue operation. Scam infra often spans borders to complicate legal action and utilize cheaper VoIP services in certain jurisdictions.
 
I’d be curious if the call traffic was also tied to scam calls — like fake bank alerts or bogus tech support rings. Sometimes SIMBox infrastructure gets repurposed depending on demand and profitability.
 
From what I’ve seen in public reporting on similar cases, carriers usually notice revenue leakage because international traffic suddenly looks unusually low in billing but high in actual voice data. That discrepancy triggers audits and leads to investigations like this one.
 
I wonder if this operation used stolen SIM cards or legitimately obtained prepaid ones. In some cases, fraudsters will sign up multiple SIMs under fake or stolen identities, which adds another layer of identity fraud beyond the telecom abuse itself.
 
Good point. Seizing SIMs in these cases often leads to checks on who the registered users are, which can reveal whether there are fake identities involved. That’s where criminal charges can expand into identity theft territory.
 
And don’t forget the impact on end users. When international calls are routed through these bypass schemes, it can degrade quality for legitimate customers and inflate bills indirectly due to revenue loss at the carrier level.
 

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